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SEPARATE BUT EQUAL
AND SINGLE-SEX SCHOOLS
Gary J. Simson†
INTRODUCTION
At the close of his opinion for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice
Warren wrote in Brown v. Board of Education1: “We conclude that in the
field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no
place.  Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”2
Though laid down in the context of public educational facilities sepa-
rated on the basis of race, does the principle that separate is inher-
ently unequal also apply to public educational facilities separated by
sex?
The Supreme Court has yet to resolve the issue, but about twenty
years after Brown, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit did.3
The Philadelphia School District had numerous high schools.  How-
ever, its two most competitive and prestigious were Central High
School, which admitted only boys, and Philadelphia High School for
Girls, which was limited to girls.  Susan Vorchheimer, an honors grad-
uate of a Philadelphia junior high school, applied for admission to
Central but was denied on the basis of her sex.  Claiming a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause, Vorchheimer succeeded in persuading
the lower court to order her admission to Central, but a divided three-
judge panel of the Third Circuit reversed.
Like the Supreme Court in the pre-Brown era,4 the panel majority
in Vorchheimer v. Philadelphia School District5 focused on courses, facili-
ties, faculty, and other measures of educational quality to determine
whether the two single-sex high schools were essentially equal.6  One
might suppose that the names of the schools alone were enough to
† Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.  This Article is based on my remarks at the
Cornell Law Review’s February 2004 conference, “Revisiting Brown v. Board of Education.”  I
am grateful to Susan Hensler and SeoJung Park for research assistance.  I also thank Risa
Lieberwitz, Trevor Morrison, Steve Shiffrin, Erika Sussman, and especially Rosalind Simson
for comments and encouragement.
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 Id. at 495.
3 Vorchheimer v. Phila. Sch. Dist., 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), aff’d by an equally
divided Court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977) (per curiam).
4 See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (comparing racially separate state law
schools and finding them unequal).
5 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976).
6 Id. at 881–83.
443
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arouse some suspicion of inequality: the “central” school was for boys,
while the presumably less central school was simply labeled as for girls.
In examining the schools, the majority did acknowledge one aspect of
inequality by noting that Central’s science facilities were “superior.”7
The court’s conclusion, however, was that in this instance separate was
essentially equal, and it rejected the plaintiff’s constitutional claim.8
Judge Gibbons wrote an impassioned dissent.  He maintained
that the majority had failed to respect the lessons of Brown. “I was
under the impression,” he wrote, “that ‘separate but equal’ analysis,
especially in the field of public education, passed from the fourteenth
amendment jurisprudential scene over 20 years ago.”9  Gibbons even
went so far as to tacitly accuse the majority of the sort of insensitivity
shown by the Supreme Court in 1896 in Plessy v. Ferguson,10 when it
laid down the separate but equal doctrine and found it satisfied in the
context of separate railroad cars for white and black passengers.
Quoting from the Court’s opinion in Plessy but substituting in brackets
“sex” for “race,” “male” for “white,” and “female” for “colored,” Gib-
bons summarized as follows the majority’s approach in upholding
Philadelphia’s two single-sex high schools:
The object of the [14th] Amendment was undoubtedly to en-
force the . . . equality of the two [sexes] before the law, but in the
nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinc-
tions based upon [sex], or to enforce social, as distinguished from
political equality, or a commingling of the two [sexes] upon terms
unsatisfactory to either.  Laws permitting, and even requiring, their
separation in places where they are liable to be brought into contact
with each other do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either
[sex] to the other, and have been generally, if not universally, rec-
ognized as within the competency of the state legislatures in the
exercise of their police power.  The most common instance of this is
connected with the establishment of separate schools for [male]
and [female] children, which has been held to be a valid exercise of
the legislative power even by courts of States where the political
rights of [women] have been longest and most earnestly enforced.11
The Supreme Court accepted the Vorchheimer case for review.  How-
ever, with then-Justice Rehnquist not participating, the Court divided
4-4, with the result that it affirmed the decision below without written
opinion.12
7 Id. at 882.
8 Id. at 887–88.
9 Id. at 888 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
10 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
11 Vorchheimer, 532 F.2d at 888 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
12 Vorchheimer v. Phila. Sch. Dist., 430 U.S. 703 (1977) (per curiam).
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Several years later in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,13
the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of public single-sex
schools but in a context presenting a much simpler legal issue.  Missis-
sippi had a state nursing school that limited admissions to women.
Joe Hogan, who lived in the city where the school was located, applied
for admission but was denied on the basis of his sex.  Although Missis-
sippi did offer coed nursing programs at other locations in the state,
none was within reasonable commuting distance for Hogan,14 and he
brought suit seeking admission to the all-female school as a matter of
equal protection.
Unlike Vorchheimer, unequal treatment on the basis of sex was ap-
parent in Hogan on the face of the system, and the Supreme Court
struck down the school’s women-only admissions policy.  Writing for
the Court, Justice O’Connor acknowledged that “[i]n limited circum-
stances, a gender-based classification favoring one sex can be justified
if it intentionally and directly assists members of the sex that is dispro-
portionately burdened.”15  She concluded, however, that in this in-
stance, “[r]ather than compensate for discriminatory barriers faced by
women, MUW’s policy of excluding males from admission to the
School of Nursing tends to perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing
as an exclusively woman’s job.”16
More recently, in United States v. Virginia17—the Virginia Military
Institute (VMI) case—the Supreme Court returned to the problem of
public single-sex schools in a factual context presenting a legal ques-
tion somewhat more complex than the one in the Mississippi case but
again substantially less complex than the one in Vorchheimer.  In and of
itself, VMI’s male-only admissions policy presented an issue mirroring
the one in Hogan. As in Hogan, unequal treatment on the basis of sex
was apparent on the face of the system.  In response to federal district
and appellate court rulings in the case at hand, however, Virginia had
proposed a coordinate program for women—the Virginia Women’s
Institute for Leadership.
In analyzing the adequacy of this proposed program to remedy
the constitutional violation presented by VMI standing alone, Justice
Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court brought separate but equal doctrine
into play.18  The proposed program, though, hardly posed a suffi-
ciently close question in this regard to require the Court to address
the ultimate question of whether sexually separate schools, like ra-
13 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
14 Id. at 723 n.8.
15 Id. at 728.
16 Id. at 729.
17 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
18 Id. at 546–54.
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cially separate schools, are inherently unequal.19  The program was
almost laughably unequal to VMI, more resembling a finishing school
than the grueling, physically and mentally exhausting program of
VMI.  In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist characterized
the program as “distinctly inferior.”20 In light of his distinct lack of
receptivity over the years to claims of unconstitutional sex discrimina-
tion,21 if he was persuaded of inequality, there should be no question
that it existed.
In this Article I will consider whether coordinate public single-sex
schools, such as those reviewed in Vorchheimer, should meet the same
fate under the Equal Protection Clause as the racially segregated
schools in Brown.  After suggesting that the fate of coordinate single-
sex schools should be seen as intimately tied to whether they disadvan-
tage girls, I consider the constitutionality of public single-sex educa-
tion when it takes a form that on its face quite overtly advantages girls:
girls are allowed to choose between a coed public school and a single-
sex one, while boys can only attend a coed public school.  Whether or
not coordinate single-sex schools and all-girls schools with no male
counterpart can survive equal protection review is a difficult and com-
plex question, and I will not try to provide a definite answer here.
Instead, my principal objective will be to provide a framework for an-
swering that question by separating out various issues central to resolv-
ing it.  The validity of public single-sex schools under federal statutory
law—in particular, Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments and
its accompanying regulations22—is an important and interesting ques-
tion as well.  In keeping, however, with the focus of this symposium on
19 In a footnote Justice Ginsburg pointed out that “[s]everal amici have urged that
diversity in educational opportunities is an altogether appropriate governmental pursuit
and that single-sex schools can contribute importantly to such diversity.” Id. at 534 n.7.
Underlining the Court’s focus in the case at hand on the peculiar fact situation presented
by VMI, Justice Ginsburg stated that “[w]e do not question the Commonwealth’s preroga-
tive evenhandedly to support diverse educational opportunities.” Id.
20 Id. at 566 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
21 See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 154–56 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 735–46 (1982) (Powell, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 18–20 (1975) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
22 Title IX provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimina-
tion under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”  20
U.S.C. 1681(a) (2001).  Implementing regulations were issued in 1975, see 34 C.F.R.
§ 106.34 (2003), and major revisions were proposed in 2004, see 69 Fed. Reg. 11276 (pro-
posed Mar. 9, 2004).  For discussion of the statute and regulations, see the Department of
Education’s commentary in support of the proposed revisions, id. at 11276–85, and the
National Women’s Law Center’s memorandum letter of April 22, 2004, opposing the pro-
posed revisions, http://www.nwlc.org/pdf/FinalSingleSexComments.
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Brown, a constitutional decision, I will limit my discussion to the ques-
tion of constitutionality.
Before turning to the constitutional analysis, I should underline
its contemporary significance.  For a variety of reasons, including cost-
savings and a belief by many that coeducation best serves children’s
intellectual and social development, coed public schools have vastly
outnumbered single-sex ones in the United States for more than a
century.23  Moreover, although there were still a significant, though
relatively small, number of single-sex public schools fifty years ago—
virtually all concentrated in major cities—those schools almost all be-
came coed or closed in the 1970s and 1980s, with actual or potential
challenges under the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX playing an
important role.24  Spurred on, however, by reports such as the Ameri-
can Association of University Women’s How Schools Shortchange Girls25
as well as articles in the popular press about gender bias in the
schools,26 public single-sex schools began to make a comeback in the
early 1990s.27  In addition, in the past few years, the Bush Administra-
23 See CAROLE B. SHMURAK, VOICES OF HOPE: ADOLESCENT GIRLS AT SINGLE SEX AND
COEDUCATIONAL SCHOOLS 5–7 (1998).
24 See ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, SAME, DIFFERENT, EQUAL: RETHINKING SINGLE-SEX
SCHOOLING 7–8, 67–70; SHMURAK, supra note 23, at 6–7.
25 AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN, HOW SCHOOLS SHORTCHANGE GIRLS:
A STUDY OF MAJOR FINDINGS ON GIRLS AND EDUCATION (1992).  This report is discussed
further infra at text accompanying notes 71–77, 82–83.
26 See, e.g., Barbara Kantrowitz, Sexism in the Schoolhouse, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 24, 1992, at
62.
27 See SHMURAK, supra note 23, at 8; Kristen J. Cerven, Note, Single-Sex Education: Pro-
moting Equality or an Unconstitutional Divide?, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 699, 700–01.  The Na-
tional Association for Single-Sex Public Education stated in 2004:
Ten years ago, only three public schools in the United States offered single-
sex educational opportunities.  Right now (spring 2004), there are at least
97 public schools in the United States offering some form of single-sex edu-
cation. . . . [There are] 25 single-sex public schools currently in opera-
tion . . . [and] 72 other public schools offering single-gender classrooms in
otherwise coed schools.
http://www.singlesexschools.org/schools.html.  (The organization defines a “single-sex
school” as “a public school in which at least one grade has only single-sex classes.” See id.)
The constitutional issue presented by the phenomenon, noted above, of single-sex classes
in coed schools may vary considerably depending on whether the sex-segregated classes are
ones in, for example, math or health.  Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to
address the constitutionality of such classes, the framework that the Article provides for
analyzing the constitutionality of single-sex schools has substantial applicability.
Almost all of the twenty-five single-sex schools listed and described at the above web-
site are either coordinate single-sex schools or all-girls schools with no male counterpart.  A
few, however, are all-boys schools with no female counterpart, and the website indicates
that a few more of that variety will be opening soon.  Although such schools might appear
to be obviously unconstitutional under United States v. Virginia, discussed supra, the issue of
constitutionality is complicated by the fact that virtually all such schools are not simply
designed to advantage boys as a general group.  Instead, they target African-American boys
based on a perceived crisis among such youths, particularly in urban areas, with regard to
involvement in criminal activity, incarceration, dropping out of school, and other serious
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tion has added momentum to this development by supporting legisla-
tion that authorizes special federal funding for public single-sex
schools28 and by proposing amendments to Title IX regulations to re-
move possible legal impediments to establishing such schools.29
I
VORCHHEIMER REVISITED: THE CASE OF COORDINATE
SINGLE-SEX SCHOOLS
As in Sweatt v. Painter,30 the pre-Brown decision finding inequality
between the University of Texas School of Law and a law school cre-
ated by Texas for black students, inequality of coordinate single-sex
schools may be clear from measures such as variety of courses, types of
facilities, faculty quality, and alumni network.  As discussed above,31
the Third Circuit in Vorchheimer found that the coordinate high
schools under review there were essentially comparable.  In a case in-
volving the same two schools several years later, however, a Penn-
sylvania state court found significant differences that made the all-
male school superior to the all-female one and ordered the admission
of women to the all-male school.32  The court did not suggest that the
schools had changed significantly since Vorchheimer, but rather basi-
cally took the view that the plaintiff’s lawyers in Vorchheimer had been
incompetent in not proving that significant differences existed at the
time.33
problems.  For discussion of the constitutional issues raised, see Garrett v. Bd. of Educ., 775
F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (enjoining, on equal protection and other grounds, the
opening in Detroit of three all-boys schools with a specialized Afrocentric curriculum);
Richard Cummings, All-Male Black Schools: Equal Protection, the New Separatism and Brown v.
Board of Education, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 725 (1993); Pamela J. Smith, Comment, All-
Male Black Schools and the Equal Protection Clause: A Step Forward Toward Education, 66 TUL. L.
REV. 2003 (1992); Verna L. Williams, Reform or Retrenchment? Single-Sex Education and the
Construction of Race and Gender, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 5.
28 See 20 U.S.C. 7215(a)(23) (Supp. I 2003) (a provision of the No Child Left Behind
Act of 2001 making federal funds available to local educational agencies for “innovative
assistance programs,” including “[p]rogams to provide same-gender schools and class-
rooms (consistent with applicable law)”).
29 See 69 Fed. Reg. 11276 (proposed Mar. 9, 2004); supra note 22.  It may be that the
Administration’s sponsorship of single-sex education is driven by a strong conviction of the
special advantages presented by such schools.  It does not seem unduly cynical, however, to
suppose that it instead is based largely on a desire to provide political cover for other
aspects of the Administration’s campaign to expand the range of educational choices avail-
able to parents—in particular, the Administration’s support of public funding of parental
choice of religious schools. Nevertheless, whatever its motivations may be, the Administra-
tion’s efforts in this regard have helped cement the practical significance today of the
question of the constitutionality of single-sex schools.
30 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
31 See supra text accompanying notes 5–8.
32 Newberg v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 26 Pa. D. & C.3d 682 (Ct. C.P. Phila. County 1983),
appeal quashed, 478 A.2d 1352 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
33 Id. at 701–05.
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In light of the history of public single-sex education in the United
States, the ultimate finding of inequality between the two Philadelphia
high schools should not have come as much of a surprise.  As Profes-
sor Hasday has documented, at least until the middle of the last cen-
tury, this history is hardly one generally characterized by equal respect
for the abilities and ambitions of both sexes.  Rather, it is one domi-
nated by gender role stereotyping, with all-boys schools typically ori-
ented to training for professional and economic success and all-girls
schools commonly oriented to training to be wives and mothers and
to fill certain low-paying, low-status jobs.34
In finding substantial equality between the two Philadelphia
schools, the panel majority in Vorchheimer dismissed any notion of
stigma.35  Quoting from Plessy and drawing on Brown,36 Judge Gibbons
in dissent seemed to regard injury of this sort as intrinsic in sex-segre-
gated schools, much as the Court in Brown had found it intrinsic in
schools segregated by race.37  Does the state’s past use of public single-
sex schools to enforce and perpetuate gender role stereotypes make
such injury likely today even if coordinate schools appear to be sub-
stantially equal in more tangible measures of equality?
Coordinate schools can be defended as enhancing the education
of both girls and boys by freeing both from the distractions of the
opposite sex during adolescence.38  More broadly, they may be seen as
providing an optimal environment for addressing the problems of
gender bias that disadvantage girls in coed schools.39  Nevertheless,
against the backdrop of a long national history of separate but une-
qual single-sex schools and in a society in which gender stereotyping is
34 See Jill Elaine Hasday, The Principle and Practice of Women’s “Full Citizenship”: A Case
Study of Sex-Segregated Public Education, 101 MICH. L. REV. 755, 795–801 (2002).
35 See Vorchheimer v. Phila. Sch. Dist., 532 F.2d 880, 882 (3d Cir. 1976) (“[Plaintiff]
submitted no factual evidence that attendance at Girls High would constitute psychological
or other injury.”); see also id. at 886 (“The plaintiff has difficulty in establishing discrimina-
tion in the school board’s policy.  If there are benefits or detriments inherent in the sys-
tem, they fall on both sexes in equal measure.”).
36 See supra text accompanying notes 9–11.
37 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (“To separate [children in grade
and high schools] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”).
38 See AMANDA DATNOW, LEA HUBBARD & ELISABETH WOODY, IS SINGLE GENDER
SCHOOLING VIABLE IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR?  LESSONS FROM CALIFORNIA’S PILOT PROGRAM 54
(2001).  As Datnow, Hubbard, and Woody observed:
[T]he belief that single gender arrangements would reduce distractions was
a commonly held assumption throughout all the [coordinate] schools [in
the California pilot program] and was echoed by administrators, teachers,
and parents.  Indeed, limiting interactions with the opposite sex served as
the method by which each district hoped to address the problems unique
to its student population. . . .
Id.
39 See id. at 12–13 (discussing “contemporary rationales for single sex education”).
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hardly a thing of the past, do coordinate single-sex schools send a
message that girls and boys are best kept separate because girls cannot
compete effectively with boys?  Or perhaps a message that sex-segre-
gated schools are desirable to ensure that girls do not interfere with
the more important education of boys?  Are the girls at the all-girls
school apt to internalize such messages and experience the type of
“feeling of inferiority” that the Court in Brown found affected the
“hearts and minds” of black schoolchildren in all-black schools?40
Even if not, are boys apt to perceive such messages and to act upon
them in the short- and long-run in ways that disadvantage girls and
women?  Even if the all-girls school is no less rigorous and competitive
than the all-boys school, will the girls’ accomplishments at their school
be undervalued by college admissions officers, employers, and others
because of preconceived notions about all-girls, as compared to all-
boys, schools?41
In sorting through these and other possibilities, a crucial issue is
whether the challenger or the state has the burden of proof on the
issue of the existence of disadvantage on the basis of sex.  The Su-
preme Court’s discussion in Brown of the disadvantage to black school-
children may fairly be read to suggest that the Court’s general
suspicion of racial classifications carried over to the separate question
of whether laws taking race into account, though not expressly dis-
advantaging one race or the other, in fact disadvantage the minority
race.42  The Supreme Court regards sex classifications with less, but
still substantial, suspicion.43  Should such suspicion carry over to the
40 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
41 With regard to the above possibilities, see DATNOW, HUBBARD & WOODY, supra note
38, at 7 (finding in a study of six sets of coordinate public single-sex schools established in
California in the late 1990s that “[t]raditional gender stereotypes were often reinforced”);
Nancy Levit, Separating Equals: Educational Research and the Long-Term Consequences of Sex Seg-
regation, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451, 518 (1999).  According to Levit:
[G]iven the history of sex segregation in American education, and the so-
cial and psychological messages that such sex exclusivity carries, it is diffi-
cult to believe that state sponsorship of sex segregation can avoid imposing
feelings of inferiority and superiority.  The ideology of separatism—even
“voluntarily” chosen separatism—carries with it a stigma: the message of
something problematic about the presence of the other sex.
Id.  For a more sanguine view of coordinate schools, see Cerven, supra note 27, at 723–27.
42 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 493–95.  The Court’s various summary dispositions after
Brown striking down without written opinion other types of racially separate public facilities
lend support to this view. See, e.g.,  New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n v. Detiege,
358 U.S. 54 (1958) (per curiam) (parks); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per
curiam) (buses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam) (golf
courses).
43 Although a four-Justice plurality opinion maintained in 1973 that sex classifica-
tions, like race classifications, are suspect, see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682–88
(1973) (plurality opinion), a majority several years later in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976), settled on treating sex classifications as essentially semi-suspect.  Middle-tier scru-
tiny, rather than the strict scrutiny reserved for suspect classifications, would apply.  Al-
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question of whether laws taking sex into account, though not ex-
pressly disadvantaging one sex or the other, in fact disadvantage one
sex—in particular, females, the group that historically has exper-
ienced disadvantage when government has classified on the basis of
sex?  More specifically, with regard to coordinate single-sex schools,
should this suspicion shift the burden to the state to disprove stigma
and other types of disadvantage to girls?
If no such disadvantage is found to exist, coordinate public sin-
gle-sex schools easily pass constitutional muster.  Although the state is
obviously taking sex into account in establishing such schools, it is not
treating anyone any better or worse on the basis of sex.  No sex classifi-
cation exists, and therefore the higher level of scrutiny triggered by sex
classifications does not come into play.44  Indeed, if no one is being
disadvantaged relative to anyone else, the equal protection issue dis-
appears.  Although the state action in establishing single-sex schools
could still be challenged under the Due Process Clause, such a chal-
lenge would clearly be fruitless.  Nothing more than rational basis re-
view would arguably apply, and a justification in terms of minimizing
distractions would easily suffice to meet that very relaxed test.
If, however, disadvantage to girls is found to exist, the state is
clearly classifying on the basis of sex, and middle-tier scrutiny applies.
As described in Craig v. Boren in 1976, this calls for a substantial rela-
tion to an important interest.45  As described in the VMI case, this
means an “exceedingly persuasive” justification,46 which seems to ele-
vate the middle-tier closer to the upper, strict scrutiny tier used for
race. In any event, whatever the precise ingredients of middle-tier
scrutiny, it is dubious that the system of coordinate single-sex schools
in question could survive such review.
First of all, coordinate single-sex schools almost certainly do not
serve the goal of minimizing distractions with sufficient precision to
meet middle-tier review.  Most obviously, any notion that separating
students by sex eliminates distractions fueled by students’ sexual at-
tractions to one another overlooks those students who are gay, les-
bian, or bisexual.  In addition, single-sex schools offer special
though I believe a strong case can be made for treating sex classifications as suspect, I take
as a given, for present purposes, the Court’s disposition of the matter in Craig.
44 The majority in Vorchheimer did not seem to appreciate this implication of its find-
ing that “[i]f there are benefits or detriments inherent in the system, they fall on both
sexes in equal measure.”  Vorchheimer v. Phila. Sch. Dist., 532 F.2d 880, 886 (3d Cir.
1976).  Having found no disadvantage on the basis of sex, the court nonetheless proceeded
to address whether the system of separate schools satisfied the standard of review triggered
by sex classifications. See id. at 887–88.
45 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
46 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996).
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distractions of their own.  A recent study of six sets of coordinate
schools in California pointed out various such distractions:
Many girls complained about noisy female peers, noting an increase
in girls’ talking in the single gender academies.  In a sense, some
girls took over the role of noisemaker, causing as much trouble as
the boys typically did.  Girls also experienced a new type of harass-
ment with heightened competition around issues of popularity.  In-
cidents of fighting among girls did not necessarily improve in single
gender settings; where girls said they used to fight over boys in coed
settings, they now fought over issues of friendship, gossiping about
each other.  Many boys noted a similar increase in teasing and dis-
ruptive behavior without the girls to act as a “buffer.”47
In short, although sex segregation may help minimize distractions
somewhat, any claim of a substantial relation to that end or anything
approaching an “exceedingly persuasive” justification seems quite
strained.
Second, an attempt to defend coordinate single-sex schools in
broader terms—as a means of achieving academic and developmental
benefits for girls and boys that could not be achieved in coed
schools—also seems destined to failure under middle-tier review.  The
evidence that public single-sex education in this country produces,
and can be expected to produce, substantial benefits for girls and boys
not available in a coed environment appears to be inconclusive at
best.  Because there have been so few single-sex public schools in the
United States in recent years, studies have largely focused on single-
sex Catholic schools, other private schools, and colleges in this coun-
try or single-sex public schools in other countries where they are more
prevalent.48  Drawing inferences for the U.S. public school context
from data collected about non-public or non-U.S. schools or about
colleges rather obviously lends itself to disagreement because of the
need to control for significant variables and the difficulty of doing
so.49  In general, however, while older studies tend to suggest substan-
tial benefits to public single-sex education, recent studies have cast
serious doubt on both the methodology of the older ones and the
existence of any such benefits.50  Perhaps most fundamentally, to the
47 DATNOW, HUBBARD & WOODY, supra note 38, at 56.
48 See SHMURAK, supra note 23, at 8–17; Pamela Haag, Single-Sex Education in Grades K-
12: What Does the Research Tell Us?, in AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN EDUCA-
TIONAL FOUNDATION, SEPARATED BY SEX: A CRITICAL LOOK AT SINGLE-SEX EDUCATION FOR
GIRLS 13 (1998) [hereinafter SEPARATED BY SEX].
49 See SHMURAK, supra note 23, at 9, 18–19; Patricia B. Campbell & Ellen Wahl, What’s
Sex Got to Do with It?  Simplistic Questions, Complex Answers, in SEPARATED BY SEX, supra note
48, at 63, 64–65; Haag, supra note 48, at 14–16.
50 See SHMURAK, supra note 23, at 8–12, 17–18; Campbell & Wahl, supra note 49, at
64–65; Valerie E. Lee, Is Single-Sex Schooling a Solution to the Problem of Gender Inequity?, in
SEPARATED BY SEX, supra note 48, at 41; Levit, supra note 41, at 485–86, 500–01. But see
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extent that single-sex schools do seem to yield advantageous results,
there typically appears to be good reason to believe that the advan-
tages derive not from the single-sex nature of the school but rather
from other distinctive features of the school such as small class size,
favorable faculty-student ratio, or special mentoring programs—fea-
tures that could be replicated in coed schools.51  Coed schools there-
fore appear to offer a means of producing these results that avoids the
disadvantaging effects of a sex classification, and the justification for
using single-sex schools is substantially diminished as a result.
Third and lastly, although it may be argued that the creation of
coordinate single-sex schools can be justified simply in terms of en-
hancing the diversity of options available to parents and children, that
justification is no more likely than the two already discussed to survive
the middle-tier scrutiny triggered by a finding that the schools in
some significant respect disadvantage girls.  Most obviously, unless a
school district allows parents and children to choose between a coed
school and a single-sex one, it has not increased their options by creat-
ing coordinate single-sex schools.  Even assuming, however, that a dis-
trict provides such a choice when creating coordinate single-sex
schools, the district’s creation of such schools still does not seem to
serve a diversity interest of importance.  I suggest that it would do so
only if the option represented by coordinate single-sex schools offers a
combination of features not only different than offered by coed
schools but also, on balance, no less favorable.  The combination of
features offered by the single-sex option, however, appears on balance
to be not as good.  On the one hand, as discussed above, coordinate
single-sex schools do not seem to promise substantial academic and
developmental benefits that could not be achieved in a coed environ-
ment.  On the other hand, as hypothesized at the outset of this discus-
sion of middle-tier review, the coordinate schools carry with them by
virtue of their single-sex character a significant disadvantage to girls
not generated by coed schools.
Though it perhaps goes without saying, I underline that the diver-
sity interest under discussion has virtually nothing to do with the di-
versity interest that the Supreme Court recently characterized as
compelling in Grutter v. Bollinger,52 the University of Michigan Law
School affirmative action case.  That interest was one in “attaining a
diverse student body,”53 and it was rooted in a recognition of the value
to the educational process of ensuring a broad range of perspectives
SALOMONE, supra note 24, at 189 (“Up to this point [2003], the findings [on single-sex
education] have been mildly and qualifiedly supportive, though by no means conclusive.”).
51 See Lee, supra note 50, at 48–51; Levit, supra note 41, at 504–05, 522–23.
52 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
53 Id. at 328.
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among the student body.  If anything, creating a single-sex school op-
tion is counterproductive in terms of that interest.  By excluding one
sex from the school, it makes for a less diverse student body and nar-
rows the range of available student perspectives.
II
BEYOND SEPARATE BUT EQUAL: SINGLE-SEX SCHOOLS ONLY
FOR GIRLS
Some school districts have created a single-sex middle or high
school for girls with no male counterpart. In doing so, they typically
have responded both to problems perceived first-hand in the district’s
schools and to studies highlighting the difficulties that adolescent girls
experience generally and in coed learning environments in particu-
lar.54  It is difficult to deny that the state is classifying on the basis of
sex when it creates such schools. Girls have an opportunity to attend a
single-sex school that boys do not. On the face of the system, boys are
being disadvantaged. Moreover, since studies of boys’ academic and
personal development reveal problems that, at least for some boys,
might be alleviated by enrollment in a single-sex school, it cannot be
seriously argued that boys are not really disadvantaged by the unavaila-
bility of a single-sex option.55
Under Supreme Court precedent, this disadvantage to boys trig-
gers the same middle-tier scrutiny as would disadvantage to girls.
Since Craig v. Boren in 1976,56 it is clear that the Supreme Court treats
classifications on the basis of sex as equally problematic whether it is
females or males who are the disadvantaged group.57  In more recent
years the Court in race cases has adopted a similar principle of what
Justice O’Connor in her opinion for the Court in Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena58 called “consistency,” treating as equally problematic laws
disadvantaging whites and ones disadvantaging racial minorities.59
This is not the place for me to try to spell out in detail my difficul-
ties with this consistency principle for classifications on the basis of
race or sex.  In brief, my argument against the principle is as follows:
First, absent disadvantage to racial minorities or females, the con-
cerns, such as relative political powerlessness of the disadvantaged
54 See Cerven, supra note 27, at 701–02.
55 For discussion of the research on boys, see SALOMONE, supra note 24, at 80–84;
Levit, supra note 41, at 469–72.
56 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
57 As the Court stated with regard to the all-female state nursing school in Mississippi
University for Women v. Hogan, “That this statutory policy discriminates against males rather
than against females does not exempt it from scrutiny or reduce the standard of review.”
458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982).
58 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
59 See id. at 224.
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group, that justify giving special scrutiny to classifications by race or
sex largely do not come into play.60  Second, a law disadvantaging
whites and one disadvantaging racial minorities are therefore not
equally problematic for equal protection purposes unless the law dis-
advantaging whites simultaneously disadvantages racial minorities in
some significant respect.  Similarly, a law disadvantaging males and
one disadvantaging females are not equally problematic unless the law
disadvantaging males simultaneously disadvantages females in some
significant respect.  Third and lastly, although any law disadvantaging
whites or males deserves careful consideration for possible disadvantage
to racial minorities or females, such laws may in fact not entail such
additional disadvantage, and they should not be assumed to do so.
It may be that my disagreement with the Court’s consistency prin-
ciple stems entirely or almost entirely from the final point of my argu-
ment.  Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court in Adarand may be
read to be compatible with my first two points.61  Rather clearly, how-
ever, that opinion insists on treating the possibility of disadvantage to
racial minorities as the equivalent, for equal protection purposes, of
actual disadvantage to racial minorities; and on that point, the Court
and I definitely part ways.
60 Over the years the Supreme Court has recognized various criteria as relevant to the
“suspectness” of classifications—most notably, the relative political powerlessness of the
disadvantaged group, see, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28
(1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971), the extent to which the disadvan-
taged group has had a history of disadvantage at the hands of lawmakers, see, e.g., Mass. Bd.
of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (per curiam); Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28,  the
degree to which the disadvantaged group has been the object of societal prejudice, see, e.g.,
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440, 443 (1985); Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 216–17 n.14 (1982), and whether the classification is based on an immutable
characteristic from birth, see, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plu-
rality opinion).  (The final, immutable characteristic, criterion is sometimes articulated
somewhat more broadly in terms of a characteristic beyond the disadvantaged group’s con-
trol. See, e.g., Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217 n.14.)  If racial classifications only disadvantage whites
and sex classifications only disadvantage males, they implicate only the last of the above
criteria.
For the view that the relative political powerlessness of the disadvantaged groups
should be the focus of the inquiry into suspectness, see Gary J. Simson, Note, Mental Illness:
A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1254–58 (1974).  Under that view, the second
and third factors named above—history of disadvantage and societal prejudice—would
merit close consideration for the insight that they offer into political powerlessness.  The
final factor of immutable characteristic, however, would probably cease to be of concern.
61 At a number of places in her opinion, Justice O’Connor seems to predicate the
need for strict scrutiny of laws disadvantaging whites on the dangers presented by such laws
of simultaneous disadvantage to racial minorities. See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 226 (main-
taining that “strict scrutiny of all governmental racial classifications is essential [to ensure
that] ‘there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate
racial prejudice or stereotype’”); id. at 228–29 (underlining that a “supposedly ‘benign’
racial classification . . . ‘inevitably is perceived by many as resting on an assumption that
those who are granted this special preference are less qualified in some respect that is
identified purely by their race’”).
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Returning, then, to the issue at hand of the constitutionality of
single-sex schools for girls with no male counterpart, I would argue
that the issue ought to turn on whether girls are in some significant
respect disadvantaged.  Cases like Hogan underline that this is hardly
just a theoretical possibility.62  The single-sex nursing school there re-
inforced gender stereotypes about the proper roles of men and wo-
men that disadvantaged women throughout the state, whatever career
choices they might be contemplating or have made. By the same to-
ken, although the Supreme Court treats discrimination against men
in and of itself as a basis for middle-tier review, the Court’s other sex
classification cases involving facial discrimination against men in fact
virtually always involved laws with a double edge—facially discrimina-
tory against men, but simultaneously implicitly reinforcing gender ste-
reotypes that disadvantage women.63
Single-sex middle or high schools for girls with no male counter-
part are considerably more defensible than the nursing school in Ho-
gan.  Such a middle or high school can be explained in terms that do
not so obviously incorporate harmful gender stereotypes—that is, as
an attempt to respond to special problems widely experienced by ado-
lescent girls64 and as providing an environment in which teaching
methods can most easily be tailored to ways of learning that girls gen-
erally seem to find most congenial.65  These explanations, however,
are not unambiguously affirming of girls’ abilities and potential, and
altogether it is difficult to deny that there is some risk that the crea-
tion of the girls school sends a message to both girls and boys that
girls are in some sense inferior to boys—whether that means more
needy, less adaptable, more fragile, or some other disempowering
comparative generalization.66  Similarly, it is at least arguable that by
62 See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982), discussed supra text
accompanying notes 13–16.
63 See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding a federal law requiring
only males to register for a possible military draft); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S.
464 (1981) (upholding a California statutory rape law that prohibits sexual intercourse if it
involves a female under 18, limits criminal penalties to males, and applies such penalties to
males even if they were under 18 when they violated the prohibition); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976) (invalidating an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer to
males under 21 and females under 18).
64 See Cerven, supra note 27, at 702 (“[S]upporters [of single-sex schools for girls]
contend that girls need particular attention and direction during their adolescent years, a
time when many may have questions or concerns about their own development.”).
65 See id. at 717 (noting that a well-known East Harlem girls school, discussed infra
note 69 and accompanying text, “stresses a collaborative, noncompetitive educational
approach”).
66 See Wendy Kaminer, The Trouble with Single-Sex Schools, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr.
1998, at 22, 34 (“The sexism in girls’ and women’s schools is insidious.  Whether mani-
fested in feminine decor or in an approach to teaching that assumes a female penchant for
cooperative, or ‘connected,’ learning, stereotypical notions of femininity often infect insti-
tutions for women and girls.”); Levit, supra note 41, at 517 (“[S]ocial separation on the
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holding out this opportunity to girls, the state unwittingly disadvan-
tages them in the long-run, if at this stage of their development it
would be more beneficial for them to learn to cope with a coed
environment.67
In my view, then, the likelihood of some significant disadvantage
to girls is central to the constitutional issue, and the state, having clas-
sified on the basis of sex, should bear the burden of disproving the
likelihood of such disadvantage.  If the state can carry that burden, I
see no reason why the state’s actions should be judged by a standard
of review more stringent than the rational basis test traditionally ap-
plied to the vast majority of classifications; and the rationales noted
above for giving adolescent girls special treatment in the form of an
all-girls school suffice to meet that indulgent standard.
basis of identity characteristics engenders feelings, habits, attitudes, and expectations of
superiority and inferiority.  State-sponsored separation promotes the idea of inherent dif-
ferences between the sexes. . . .”); Sharon K. Mollman, Note, The Gender Gap: Separating the
Sexes in Public Education, 68 IND. L.J. 149, 169 (1992).  In Mollman’s view:
The social cost of excluding boys is not their subsequent feelings of inferi-
ority, for their sense of power is too well entrenched.  Instead, they perceive
that girls are inferior because they will not compete with boys.  There is a
danger too that girls might choose the single-gender school over the co-ed
one because they believe it must be less competitive, thus reinforcing their
own sense of personal and gender inferiority.
Id.  But see SALOMONE, supra note 24, at 20–25 (describing the “conscious effort” of one girls
school “to present students and parents with a positive sense of womanhood” and main-
taining that “the all-girl setting incorporates certain intangible elements—a feeling of
school pride, self-confidence, and security—that are conducive to academic
achievement”).
67 See SHMURAK, supra note 23, at 173 (discussing results of her study of single-sex and
coed schools, including comments by many girls in coed schools that being with boys
“helped me to be aggressive,” taught them that “boys were people who could be my
friends,” and was “good practice for college and the real world”); Kaminer, supra note 66,
at 34 (“Many [girls’ and women’s schools] encourage female academic achievement, but
they discourage academic competition with males.  They encourage heterosexual women
and girls to separate their social and intellectual lives, reinforcing the dissonance bred into
many achievement-oriented females.”); Levit, supra note 41, at 495 (“The majority of re-
searchers . . . have found results suggesting that coeducation may better prepare students
for adult occupational and interpersonal roles, including the understanding of how to
maintain long-term relationships with members of the opposite sex and how to avoid fall-
ing unthinkingly into traditional or stereotypic roles.”). But see SALOMONE, supra note 24, at
35–37 (characterizing three girls’ schools as “safe harbors where girls can securely weather
the storms of adolescence while nurturing their spirit and intellect” and maintaining that
the students there “have neatly compartmentalized their intellectual and social lives for the
time being and feel confident that the skills and attitudes they develop in an all-girls setting
will serve them well when they move on to a coed college”); Carrie Corcoran, Comment,
Single-Sex Education After VMI: Equal Protection and East Harlem’s Young Women’s Leadership
School, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 987, 1031 (1997) (acknowledging the possibility that “some on-
lookers” may view the much-discussed girls school in East Harlem “as a manifestation of
girls’ inferiority in subjects like science and math,” but suggesting that “it seems more likely
that the school will produce capable young women who are confident in their abilities and
whose lives will be a testament to the invalidity of negative gender role stereotypes”).
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However, if the state cannot carry the burden of disproving disad-
vantage to girls, the school is on constitutionally shaky ground.  Mid-
dle-tier review would apply, and the state’s justification does not seem
sufficiently forceful to satisfy that test.  The state could argue that the
school is defensible as a means of achieving significant academic and
developmental benefits for girls that could not be achieved in coed
schools.  As discussed earlier, however, the evidence that single-sex
schools achieve benefits of this sort seems too weak to establish the
substantial means-end connection required by middle-tier review.68
With single-sex girls schools that principally admit poor minority
girls, such as the much-publicized Young Women’s Leadership School
in East Harlem,69 the state might offer a second argument: Absent
some special intervention by the state on behalf of such girls, the girls
would be unlikely ever to overcome the constraints placed on their
advancement by poverty and by societal discrimination against minori-
ties.  Though certainly not without its attractions, this alternative argu-
ment does not avoid the difficulty that undermines the first.  Given
the scarcity of evidence showing that single-sex schools deliver signifi-
cant academic and developmental benefits that could not be achieved
in coed schools, the state does not appear to have a weighty justifica-
tion for using a single-sex, rather than coed, school as the means of
helping poor minority girls avoid an unfortunate fate.  The cogency of
this alternative argument is also undercut by the difficulty of explain-
ing why the state’s interest in helping poor minorities avoid an unfor-
tunate fate is limited to girls.  Assuming for purposes of argument that
single-sex schools really have the advantages for poor minority girls
that their proponents claim, why is the state not also furnishing single-
sex schools for poor minority boys?  Poor minority boys face daunting
obstacles to a reasonably successful future—even more daunting,
some have argued, than poor minority girls.70  It is not apparent that
they are any less in need of special state assistance.
68 See supra text accompanying notes 48–51.
69 The initiative to create this school generated a great deal of publicity and contro-
versy right around the time that the Supreme Court decided the VMI case.  Threatened
legal action never materialized, the school was established, and it has largely gotten quite
favorable reviews. See SALOMONE, supra note 24, at 10–25 (discussing the founding and
subsequent history of the school); Cerven, supra note 27, at 703–04, 717–19 (same).  More
than 90% of the students are either Hispanic or African-American, and a substantial major-
ity fall below the poverty line. See SALOMONE, supra note 24, at 21; Williams, supra note 27,
at 20 n.31.  For statistics on the percentage of minority students at other single-sex schools,
see id.
70 See supra note 27 (discussing the arguments made for single-sex schools for African-
American boys).  For a critical perspective on the motivations for creating single-sex
schools that target minorities, see Williams, supra note 27.
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CONCLUSION
In this Article I have focused on the constitutional issues
presented by public single-sex schools.  In closing, I would like to un-
derline that various of the issues discussed have important policy im-
plications as well.  Thus, even if public single-sex schools are
constitutional, lawmakers should think seriously before creating new
ones (or maintaining existing ones) about questions such as whether
schools of this sort are apt to stigmatize girls and whether any benefits
seemingly offered by existing single-sex schools are attributable to
their single-sex nature or instead derive from factors that could be
replicated in coed schools.
I also would like to suggest in closing that even if public single-sex
schools pass constitutional muster, they represent too limited a re-
sponse to the gender equity problems that, as noted earlier,71 spurred
renewed interest in public single-sex education in recent years.  As the
American Association of University Women’s widely discussed 1992 re-
port, How Schools Shortchange Girls,72 explained in detail,73 the nation’s
coed public schools disadvantage girls in various ways.  Even though
the Equal Protection Clause stands as an obvious bar to school poli-
cies, such as precluding girls from taking shop or advanced physics,
that formally deny to girls educational opportunities made available to
boys, many forms of more subtle—but cumulatively substantial—dis-
crimination persist: history textbooks that pay little heed to women’s
accomplishments,74 teachers who repeatedly respond with more en-
thusiasm and encouragement to boys’ comments than girls’,75 lax en-
forcement of prohibitions on peer sexual harassment,76 etc.77
71 See supra text accompanying notes 25–27.
72 AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN, supra note 25.
73 For a later summary of the results of numerous studies, see Levit, supra note 41, at
464–69.
74 See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN, supra note 25, at 62–63; Levit,
supra note 41, at 467.
75 See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN, supra note 25, at 68–70; Levit,
supra note 41, at 464–66.
76 See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN, supra note 25, at 73–74; Levit,
supra note 41, at 468.
77 Under the Supreme Court’s approach under the Equal Protection Clause to dis-
proportionate impact, state action that disproportionately disadvantages females, but does
not formally single them out for disadvantage, receives very different treatment than state
action formally disadvantaging them.  The only basis for constitutional challenge is to show
that the state would not have acted as it did but for a conscious and invidious desire to
discriminate against females. See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).  The
Court’s approach essentially duplicates the one that it had developed somewhat earlier for
laws disproportionately disadvantaging racial minorities. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v.
Metro. Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
This is not the place for me to detail my objections to what I see as an unduly narrow
approach to the problems of gender-based and race-based bias in lawmaking.  Suffice it to
say that in my view the Court’s approach wrongly insulates from constitutional challenge
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Even assuming, for purposes of argument, that public single-sex
schools are, and will be, reasonably successful at helping their female
students avoid the disadvantages widely experienced by girls in coed
schools, they almost inevitably will leave the basic problems largely un-
touched.  The great majority of girls are being, and very likely will
continue to be, educated in coed schools. There is unlikely to be a
proliferation of public single-sex schools.  First of all, for a variety of
reasons, most children and parents want a coed education.78  In addi-
tion, establishing single-sex schools in lieu of, or in addition to, coed
schools can be a costly proposition.  Particularly for small communi-
ties, it may often not be a financially realistic option.79  Finally, any
school district contemplating the creation of multiple single-sex
schools ought to be given considerable pause by the recognition that
to the extent that public single-sex schools have been successful, their
success appears to depend upon (1) a commitment of resources per
child that school districts typically are not in a position to make for
large numbers of children80 and (2) a selectivity in admissions that
would exclude a large proportion of the children in the district.81
Ultimately, then, if school districts are really serious about solving
the gender equity problems identified by the American Association of
University Women and others, they need to tackle them head-on by
changing the practices and atmosphere in coed schools.  Indeed, al-
though the American Association of University Women’s 1992 report
was instrumental in reviving interest in public single-sex schools, the
Association in 1998 issued a follow-up report, Separated by Sex,82 that
governmental indifference to, or tolerance of, disproportionate effects that the govern-
mental actor would have taken measures to avoid if the disadvantaged group were males or
the racial majority.  In the context at hand, the approach assures schools that if they can
only be charged with tolerating, or even unwittingly fostering, an environment that works
to the disadvantage of girls, they are on constitutionally safe ground.  Although, as indi-
cated at the outset, it is beyond the scope of this Article to address the implications of Title
IX, I note that at least as applied, Title IX does not appear to have had a significant impact
on the types of nonformal discrimination discussed in the text above. See Levit, supra note
41, at 466–69.
78 See SALOMONE, supra note 24, at 237 (noting the “overwhelming cultural preference
for coeducation”).
79 See SHMURAK, supra note 23, at 6; Hasday, supra note 34, at 802–03.
80 In addition to the local, state, and federal funding that any public school in the
district would receive, the East Harlem school, which as of 2003 had a total of 365 students
in grades 7-12, received approximately $1,000 per student each year from the private
Young Women’s Leadership Foundation.  The private funding finances a full-time college
adviser and other support services. See SALOMONE, supra note 24, at 19, 21–22.
81 For the 2002–03 school year, the East Harlem school, which now has grades 7-12,
received more than 550 applications for the 60 seventh-grade seats.  To select among the
applicants, the school interviewed them individually, had them take a written test to mea-
sure writing and math abilities, examined their school records to date (including attend-
ance and disciplinary records), and required and reviewed teacher recommendations. See
id. at 21.
82 SEPARATED BY SEX, supra note 48.
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indicated that the Association did not (and never did) regard single-
sex schools as the solution to the problems that it had detailed.83  The
creation of one or two single-sex schools may have symbolic value,
providing visible evidence that the district is thinking about those
problems.  If the goal, however, is to see that all the district’s children
have an educational environment in which they can flourish, the dis-
trict’s resources—not simply money, but time, energy, and creativity
as well—seem far better expended on reforming its coed schools.
83 See id. at 1–10 (“discussion summary” of roundtable of educational scholars, various
of whose contributions are printed in the remainder of the report); Maggie Ford, Edito-
rial, Gender-Bias Study Does Not Advocate Single-Sex Education, WASH. TIMES, May 19, 1999, at
A18 (discussion of 1992 and 1998 reports by president of American Association of Univer-
sity Women Educational Foundation).  For commentary urging reform of coed schools,
rather than the creation of single-sex schools, as the appropriate response to existing gen-
der equity problems, see Kaminer, supra note 66; Lee, supra note 50, at 46–51; Levit, supra
note 41, at 522–26.
